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U.S. DVDs. And foreign computer and business service 
ﬁrms are now “insourcing” to the United States; for in-
stance, buying or establishing a U.S. afﬁliate so that they can 
better manage their interactions with U.S. customers. 
Foreign outsourcing has also helped U.S. ﬁrms to lower 
their computer hardware, software, and other input costs 
by obtaining these items offshore. These cost reductions 
have given the U.S. economy an indirect boost by allowing 
ﬁrms to attract business they otherwise would not have 
had and therefore to employ people they otherwise could 
not have employed. Analysts do not know how many out-
sourcing-related hires have offset the 1 million outsourc-
ing-related layoffs over this period. But it is clearly wrong 
to compare the estimated 1 million gross layoffs caused by 
outsourcing with the net loss of 2 million jobs between 
late 2000 and late 2003. That would be like comparing 
an apple with half an orange. 
In truth, it should be no surprise that the economic im-
pact of these recent job shifts has been pretty modest to 
date. For one thing, imports of “other private services,” 
which include the business and professional services of 
most interest in the current debate, amounted to only 0.7 
percent of GDP in 2003, while U.S. imports of “other pri-
vate services” from all of developing Asia (not just China) 
amounted to less than 0.1 percent. That’s far too small to 
have a signiﬁcant impact on U.S. output or job growth. 
Second, while the U.S. is running a huge trade deﬁcit 
overall, the nation continues to export more services than 
we import. Indeed, our trade surplus in “other private ser-
vices” is growing not just overall but vis-à-vis developing 
Asia as well. Clearly, U.S. workers remain highly competi-
tive in high-value-added services—even in Asia. 
Most important, these job ﬂows must be viewed in the 
context of the truly extraordinary dynamism of the U.S. 
economy—an economy in which almost 1 million people 
leave an old job and almost 1 million people start a new 
one every week. From time to time, over periods of a year 
or two, job separations may slightly exceed hires, and em-
ployment falls. But over the long haul since World War 
II, hires have exceeded separations and employment has 
grown decade after decade, despite our increased expo-
sure to international trade. This relationship held during 
the period of U.S. business expansion in Europe in the 
late 1960s and 1970s, when the Europeans were sure that 
Americans would wind up owning all of Europe. The re-
lationship also held in the 1980s, when the land under the 
Emperor’s palace in Tokyo was worth as much as the state 
of California and Americans thought the Japanese might 
buy up much of the U.S. And it held in the NAFTA years, 
despite that giant sucking sound. None of these episodes 
had any perceptible lasting impact on long-term U.S. job 
growth. The same will surely be true of the developing 
world’s emergence as an economic power. S
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The book is well timed, coming in the midst of investigations 
of trading activities at mutual funds and at major exchanges, 
at a time of intense competition between different exchange 
mechanisms (the New York Stock Exchange’s specialist system 
and Nasdaq’s electronic system), and in an atmosphere of debate 
about the fundamental rules that have long proscribed traders’ 
decisions. A thorough reading will enhance the practice of the 
practitioner, the economics of the economist, and the ﬁnances 
of the ﬁnancier. Whatever one thinks about the recent travails 
of the SEC, it clearly has a remarkably well-informed chief 
economist for these trying times.
While it certainly has a scholarly foundation and a bit of 
algebra, the book is written for practitioners; a Ph.D. in eco-
nomics or ﬁnance is not required. Rather, Harris guides the 
reader skillfully through an extremely complicated subject. 
Each chapter begins with a clear statement of its goals and ends 
with a clear summary of its achievements. Meaningful terms 
are italicized to let the reader know that they will be used in 
subsequent discussion. In the early chapters, for example, the 
reader is introduced to a taxonomy of trading motives, such as 
hedging, blufﬁng, arbitrage, news trading, utilitarian trading, and 
so on. This taxonomy is not gratuitous—the terms deﬁne and 
highlight the different trading styles that exchanges and trading 
institutions must incorporate and serve, and the italics provide 
road signs that keep the reader on track. Harris has obviously 
thought carefully about how to help the reader carry a heavy 
load without unnecessary hufﬁng and pufﬁng. 
The book is also liberally dosed with examples—real and 
hypothetical—that illustrate the concepts developed in the text. 
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good or bad, and trading experiences. Want to read 
about front running? Or quote matching? You will ﬁnd 
simple, clear examples in the sidebars, with support-
ing details in the text. Just reading the sidebars is an 
education.
So much for style. What can a reader get from this 
book? The answer is, more than any reviewer can re-
port. The ﬁrst quarter of the book sets the background 
by identifying the key elements of market microstruc-
ture—the instruments (primarily equity-related); the 
institutional arrangements and actors that facilitate 
trades (dealers, brokers, exchanges, specialists, ﬂoor 
traders, clearing and settlement agents); the key trading 
styles (investor, speculator, bluffer, hedger, arbitrageur, 
news trader); the types of orders that exist (market, lim-
it, stop, market-not-ﬁll, ﬁll or kill); and the acronymic parties 
that regulate the securities industry (the SEC, the SROs, the 
CFTC). This portion of the book is not unique—plumbing 
diagrams for markets and transaction mechanisms are covered 
in many books. What makes Harris’s treatment so valuable is 
the depth of the detail, the careful crafting of concepts used 
throughout the book, and his skillful application of economic 
insights.
One way to convey the ﬂavor of the rest of this encyclopedic 
volume is to highlight some of the lessons that can be learned.   
This review focuses on insights that crop up 
repeatedly in Harris’s book. One is the crucial 
role that information plays in shaping trad-
ing behavior and setting prices. Each trader 
is in competition with every other trader, and 
the ability to mask motives and hold informa-
tion close to the chest is a trader’s bread and 
butter. The second is the role that exchanges 
and other institutional arrangements play in 
providing liquidity—they make their money 
by giving traders a way to convert a security 
to a more liquid asset (such as cash) quickly 
and at low cost.  
INFORMATION, ADVERSE
SELECTION, AND THE 
BID-ASKED SPREAD
There are many economic situations where 
buyers and sellers are aware that they have 
access to different information. For example, 
a health insurance company knows that its 
customers have more information about their 
own health and habits than does the compa-
ny. It also knows that customers who decide 
to buy insurance are more likely to have poor 
health than those who do not—an example 
of what economists call adverse selection. At 
a given premium, the insurance company 
would rather transact with healthy custom-
ers; but since it can’t always distinguish them 
from unhealthy customers, it must charge a 
higher premium to everyone.
A security dealer is in a similar position. Its 
customers include both informed and unin-
formed traders. Informed traders have special 
information about the fundamental value of a 
security, perhaps from access to inside infor-
mation or from highly developed forecasting 
skills. Informed traders typically proﬁt from 
their information by buying when dealers set 
the price at which they are willing to sell too low, and selling 
when dealers set the price at which they are willing to buy too 
high. Uninformed traders, among whom Harris would count 
dealers (because they make their living on trade-making, not 
on special knowledge), utilitarian traders (who trade for reasons 
unrelated to knowledge of futures prices, such as diversifying 
a concentrated portfolio), and noise traders (whose trades are 
conditioned by whim, enthusiasm, and irrelevant information), 
will lose money in the long run to informed traders. Because 
trading is a zero-sum game—one gets above-average returns 
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only because someone else gets below-aver-
age returns—the money that informed traders 
make comes from uninformed traders.
Harris uses these insights to analyze the 
bid-asked spread—the spread between the 
price at which a dealer will buy (the bid 
price) and the higher price at which he or 
she will sell (the asked price). He identiﬁes 
two components to the spread. The ﬁrst is 
the minimum spread that covers the dealer’s 
expenses: If the cost of ﬁnancing inventory, 
renting space, acquiring trading technology, 
setting up shop, and the opportunity cost of   
time is 25 cents per share traded, the bid-
asked spread can’t long fall below 25 cents or 
the dealer will go out of business.
But to this the dealer adds an extra amount 
to reﬂect the differences in information that 
exist because the dealer trades with informed 
and uninformed traders, often without know-
ing which type is on the other side of the 
trade. That is, the dealer faces an adverse 
selection problem similar to the one faced 
by the health insurance company. Dealers 
would rather trade with uninformed traders 
and avoid informed traders—the mere fact 
that someone wants to trade with the dealer 
might reveal that the dealer’s quotes are out 
of line. But when asked for a quote, dealers 
typically don’t know if the other trader is in-
formed or uninformed (although they do their 
best to ﬁnd out). To be compensated for the 
risk that the trader is informed, the dealer will 
widen the bid-asked spread and collect more 
from both informed and uninformed traders. 
In effect, uninformed traders are paying the 
dealer for his losses on trades with informed 
traders. Moreover, trading costs are higher 
than in a world where informed traders are 
easily identiﬁed, and the volume of trading is 
lower. Differences in information result in markets that don’t 
always work efﬁciently.
LIQUIDITY, LIMIT ORDERS, AND EXCHANGES
Exchanges exist to facilitate trades and provide liquidity to 
traders. But if the traders who supply valuable liquidity don’t 
receive compensation, they are likely to provide less of it than 
is efﬁcient. So exchanges have an incentive to set rules that 
encourage those trades to provide liquidity—although in some 
instances, these rules have other consequences as well.
Market orders for securities, Harris notes, represent 
a demand for liquidity—traders submitting them want 
to trade quickly, and they are willing to pay a price to 
be able to do so. When there is an imbalance between 
market buy and market sell orders—more buys than 
sells, or the reverse—the demand for liquidity exceeds 
the supply. The missing liquidity can be provided by 
a limit order book that lists the orders to buy or sell 
speciﬁed quantities at speciﬁed prices.
For example, suppose that a market order to buy 100 
shares of ABC Corp. remains unexecuted for want of 
a matching market sell order. If a trader places a limit 
order to sell 200 shares of ABC at $75, the 100-share 
market buy order will be matched with the limit order 
and executed at $75 per share; a limit sell order for 100 
shares at $75 will remain in the book awaiting a future market 
buy order for 100 shares or more. If no limit orders existed, 
ABC’s price would rise to whatever level is necessary to generate 
a market sell order for 100 or more shares to match the buy order. 
Just as market orders represent a demand for liquidity, limit 
orders are a source of liquidity. Without limit orders, liquid-
ity would be reduced and market buy orders would generate 
greater price volatility. 
These limit orders have value to other traders—a limit order to 
buy 1,000 shares at $50 is a put option (the right to sell a security 
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at a speciﬁed price) for a trader who owns the security 
or wants to sell short; he knows that he can submit a 
market sell order for at least 1,000 shares that will be 
executed at a price no lower than $50. Similarly, a limit 
order to sell 1,000 shares at $50 is a call option (the right 
to buy a security at a speciﬁed price); a potential buyer 
knows she can buy at least 1,000 shares at a price no 
higher than $50. The limit orders have an option value 
because they allow market-order traders to make trades 
quickly—that is, to obtain liquidity—and diminish 
risk. But limit-order traders receive no compensation 
for this value, and thus they submit fewer limit orders 
than if they did receive compensation. This raises the 
number of market orders relative to limit orders—in 
other words, increasing the demand for liquidity while 
reducing its supply. As a result, the market is less liquid and 
prices are more volatile than is desirable. 
But because exchanges compete with each other for business, 
they have an incentive to adopt rules that increase the supply of 
liquidity and reduce the inefﬁciency. In the case of limit orders, 
there are a number of ways to accomplish this. Harris not only 
gives a ﬂavor of the different methods, but also discusses some 
of their unintended consequences. 
The approach adopted by the New York Stock Exchange and 
some others is to introduce a trader responsible for smoothing 
prices—a specialist. The specialist matches 
market buy and sell orders and keeps a limit 
order book. During periods when liquidity is 
especially low, the specialist is supposed to 
enter buy or sell orders for its own account, 
thereby directly providing liquidity. But the 
specialist’s services are not without potential 
adverse consequences. Recently, some spe-
cialist ﬁrms have been charged with using the 
information at their command to extract un-
seemly proﬁts from traders. One way of doing 
this is to use their monopolistic knowledge 
of the order book—of the options provided 
by limit orders—to their advantage, as in 
quote matching. Another technique is front 
running—knowing that a large market buy 
order has been placed, the specialist might 
buy for his own account ahead of the cus-
tomer, execute the market buy order to drive 
the price up, then sell the shares he had just 
bought. In short, a specialist system can en-
hance liquidity, but at some cost—unless the 
exchange’s rules and policing are sufﬁcient to 
rein in the specialist’s greed.
Another way to enhance liquidity is to 
halt trading during periods when demand 
for liquidity is high. Prior to 1987, trading 
halts were informally managed by the indi-
vidual exchanges. Since then, formal circuit 
breakers, quantitative rules triggering trading 
halts, have become standard. While the ef-
fect of trading halts is controversial, a debate 
that Harris discusses in detail, they do allow 
new information to be obtained and assessed, 
and the reopening of trading can create more 
stable prices than if trading had continued. 
Why? Read Harris’s sections on the differ-
ences between call markets and continuous 
trading markets.
Yet another way to encourage liquidity is 
to reduce the value inherent in limit orders. This might seem 
counterintuitive, but traders are more likely to submit uncom-
pensated limit orders if the information they provide is less 
valuable.
 One way to reduce the value of a limit order is to increase the 
tick value, the minimum price difference at which trades can oc-
cur. A tick value of 1/8 (12.5 cents per share) was once common; 
at present, a tick is a mere penny a share. At a penny, traders 
can make money more easily off the limit orders of other traders, 
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than by 12.5 cents, and thus more likely that an option will be 
exercised. In spite of this, major exchanges recently voluntarily 
“decimalized,” reducing their ticks to a penny, after a price-set-
ting scandal brought the threat of Congressional action.
Finally, the value of a limit order depends upon other traders 
knowing that the order exists. If a trader can place a limit order 
without revealing its size, he or she has a chance to improve the 
average price received by selling ﬁrst to the most optimistic and 
highest bidders, then to successively lower bidders until the 
block is gone. Alternatively if a trader wants to use limit orders 
to sell a large block of shares but is required to place a single 
order in the book, other traders know that buy orders can be 
executed at a price no higher than the price in the limit sell 
order. To encourage large orders, some exchanges, such as the 
Euronext Paris Bourse and two major Electronic Communica-
tions Networks (ECNs), Archipelago and Island, allow traders 
to hide the size of their limit orders. 
EXCHANGE RULES AND ETHICAL BREACHES
Harris also devotes time to outlining the ways that breaches of 
ethics affect market prices and trading rules. Major exchanges 
have adopted rules to limit abuses by brokers and specialists. 
The public precedence rule prohibits a broker from placing an or-
der for its own account ahead of an order for a public customer’s 
account; this prohibits front running. The time precedence rule 
prohibits execution of a market order before an earlier-submit-
ted order has been executed for another customer; this prevents 
brokers from allowing one client’s order to front-run another’s. 
Brokers also are prohibited from fraudulent trade assignments, 
in which orders from different clients are executed at different 
prices, but the broker assigns the more proﬁtable trades to fa-
vored clients (the allegation against Hillary Clinton’s commod-
ity broker). In short, brokers cannot favor their own accounts 
or the accounts of preferred clients. Nor can a broker engage 
in tipping one client to the activities of another (think Martha 
Stewart). Sometimes honored in the breach, these practices will 
get the attention of the SEC—or of Eliot Spitzer.
Harris also documents practices classiﬁed as market ma-
nipulation. Gunning a stock occurs when a trader buys either 
the stock or a derivative of it (such as a futures contract) with 
the intent of triggering others to buy and to drive up the price. 
Stop orders facilitate stock gunning because they become market 
orders if the stock price reaches the stop level. Similarly, any 
strategy that introduces momentum into the demand for stocks, 
such as portfolio insurance, will serve the same purpose.
Harris does a thorough job of laying it all out. There are plenty 
of useful lessons in this book for the reader who is willing to 
pay attention, to be patient, and to read carefully—or who is 
looking for an excellent reference book when questions about 
market microstructure arise. S
Trading Shenanigans
FRONT RUNNING A broker-dealer receives a large buy order but 
executes a buy order for its own account or for a favored client 
before executing the ﬁrst order, thereby proﬁting from price 
changes induced by that order. 
GUNNING A STOCK A trader who knows that stop-buy orders1 
have been submitted buys the stock or a related derivative to 
trigger the stop-buy orders, then sells the stock after the price 
rises. 
BLUFFING A trader with a large long position to sell submits a 
buy order hoping that other traders will interpret this favorably, 
creating a price increase after which he/she can sell his/her large 
position. Bluffers might also use wash trades2 to create the 
appearance of increased volume. 
TIPPING Also called inappropriate order disclosure, this is a 
form of insider trading in which a broker feeds a client privileged 
information, such as that a large order has been submitted by 
another client who is a senior manager of the company. Tipping 
of stop orders can also lead to gunning the stock. 
FRAUDULENT TRADE ASSIGNMENT A broker receives multiple 
buy orders that are executed at different prices, but gives best 
prices to favored clients rather than assigning correct prices to 
each order. 
RUMOR MONGERING Creating misinformation about stocks to 
proﬁt from price changes. 
PREARRANGED TRADING A broker arranges a trade with another 
broker without exposing the order to other traders who might give 
better prices. Allowed in some markets under certain conditions.
KICKBACKS A broker sends an order to be ﬁlled at a poor price, 
then takes a cut of the gains enjoyed by the other broker.
UNAUTHORIZED TRADING A broker trades on a client’s behalf 
without informing the client. 
CHURNING A broker advises a client to buy or sell in order 
to increase commission revenues. Inattentive clients can be 
victimized by churning through unauthorized trading. 
QUOTE MATCHING A quote matcher has information on the 
order book and uses it to limit losses. If he/she knows that there 
is a limit order to buy at $75 or less, he/she can buy at $75.05. 
Potential proﬁts are unlimited but potential losses are capped at 
ﬁve cents per share. 
Examples used are buy orders, but the same tactics work with sell orders.
1 A stop-buy order becomes a market order to buy when the price of the last trade rises to the stop price. 
Stop-buy orders tend to create upward momentum by inducing price increases after prices have increased. 
Stop-sell orders work in the opposite fashion, becoming market-sell orders when the price falls to the 
speciﬁed stop price. 
2 Wash trades are the prearranged simultaneous submission of buy and sell orders for equal quantities. 
They create an illusion of increased volume without affecting prices or traders’ net positions. 